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perpetuate old inequalities in modern dress,
rather than bring about "positive diversity", is
a reiterated theme ofthese articles. Another
common theme is the inherently problematic
nature of a mercantile model invoking
"competition" and "customers". The vexed
issue ofknowledge creation surfaces again in
Mel Bartley's investigation ofthe relationship
between research and policy in the case ofthe
unemployment and health debate. Even when
research is deemed desirable, what shapes the
questions asked, and ignores others? All these
essays are stimulating and provocative, and the
authors do not shy away from exploring
ambiguities in their evaluations ofthe losses
and gains produced by change.
Lesley A Hall, Wellcome Institute
David E Leary (ed.), Metaphors in the history
ofpsychology, Cambridge Studies in the
History ofPsychology, Cambridge University
Press, 1994, pp. xiii, 383, £37.50, $69.95
(hardback 0-521-37166-X); £12.95, $17.95
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Over the last twenty years, the subjects of
metaphor and language have provided the
grounds for an increasing rapprochement
between practitioners and historians of
psychology. This volume is a testimony to that
rapprochement. Drawing together essays from
prominent psychologists such as Karl Pribram
and Jerome Bruner and respected historians
like Karl Danziger and David Leary, the
volume promises to "raise the consciousness"
of its readers "regarding the uses-and
abuses-of metaphor in the history of
psychology". In this respect, at least, the work
is largely successful.
The authors, "with eyes peeled for
metaphor" (to use Bruner and Feldman's
distressing phrase), assiduously catalogue
examples of analogy across two thousand years
ofpsychology and its philosophical and
political precursors. There is some overlap in
the subject matter ofthe contributions. Whilst
Paul McReynolds and Theodore Sarbin explore
the metaphors which have been employed in
the characterization ofboth desired and
uncontrolled motivation, James Averill takes
just one source ofmotive, emotion, and
demonstrates how this itselfcan be divided
into at least six categories: ranging from inner
feelings through to social roles. This concern
with the social bases ofpgychology and
selfhood informs Kenneth Gergen's essay, as
he traces the various images which have been
used to symbolize society.
The remaining essays concentrate on
metaphors of consciousness and cognition.
Bruner and Feldman contrast the passive
metaphors ofconsciousness which populated
the associative tradition with the creative or
active model ofcognition proposed by Charles
Sanders Peirce. Likewise, Karl Danziger
focuses on theories ofpsychological
association, showing how the looseness of this
metaphor has allowed various authors to
construct an imperializing cannon which
encompassed authors as diverse as Aristotle
and Hume. Karl Pribram's essay and the co-
authored contribution by Robert Hoffman,
Edward Cochran and James Nead chart the
deployment of images from computer
processing and telecommunications in current
models of the brain. These last two essays
invoke a weird teleology, in which
technological innovation is seen as providing a
greater and greater approximation to the inner
nature ofthe human mind.
The problem with most ofthese essays is
that they all too often degenerate into simple
lists of metaphors occurring within the
different specialisms ofpsychology. There is
no theoretical perspective or critique informing
the volume as a whole, as Leary says, "No
contributor had to sign an oath ofallegiance."
It might have been better ifthey had. Whilst
many of the authors celebrate the role of
metaphor as a heuristic device, only Danziger
explores the connection which metaphor posits
between scientific language and the social
world. This could, in the spirit of the work, be
attributed to the role ofmetaphor itself.
Metaphor, we are told, "motivates" or
"generates" further research. Such phrases
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gloss over and disguise the very real sense of
social effort required in the transition from one
theory to another.
On another level, much ofthe information in
this volume also remains hidden. The book's
organization, which combines Oxford notation
with conventional footnotes and individual
bibliographies, disrupts the natural flow of
reading. The footnotes and bibliographies,
which demonstrate a wealth oforiginal
research, remain obscured. This is a particular
pity in the case ofLeary's introduction, where
the footnotes equal the length oftheir parent
article. Nevertheless, this work does
successfully realize its avowed aim ofalerting
the reader to the role ofmetaphor,
demonstrating its function and power in both
the history and the historiography of
psychology.
Rhodri Hayward, Lancaster University
Laura Otis, Organic memory: history and the
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centuries, Texts and Contexts, vol. 11, Lincoln
and London, University ofNebraska Press,
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Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of
interest in memory and its maladies. The larger
share ofrecent scholarship, in tandem with
contemporary psychological preoccupations
with trauma, repression and false memories,
has focused upon the history ofthe
psychodynamics ofmemory and forgetting as
witnessed by Ian Hacking's Rewriting the soul:
multiplepersonality and the sciences of
memory (Princeton University Press, 1995).
Laura Otis' Organic memory opens with an
evocation ofanother set ofcontemporary
concerns: the spectre ofethnic cleansing, the
holocaust and the genome project, which she
depicts as configurations ofthe clustering of
history, race, heredity, and national identity
-under the sign ofmemory. Organic memory is
Otis' appellation to designate the formation of
such a nexus at the end ofthe nineteenth
century, which, whilst officially discredited,
continues to lead a metaphorical afterlife.
According to Otis, the theory oforganic
memory rested on two main pillars: Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck's theory ofthe inheritance of
acquired characteristics and Ernst Haeckel's
biogenetic law, that ontogeny recapitulated
phylogeny. Otis reconstructs how, through the
work offigures such as Ewald Hering, Samuel
Butler, Theodule Ribot and Richard Semon,
the theory oforganic memory came to be a
Foucauldian episteme that pervaded western
culture in the period between 1870 and 1918.
Otis argues that a further constitutive element
ofthe organic theory was represented by the
Volkerpsychologie ofMoritz Lazarus,
Heymann Steinthal and Wilhelm Wundt, which
analogized cultural and individual
development. Otis states that the proponents of
organic memory theory identified memory with
heredity, and located history in the body: "by
envisioning history as something accumulated
by a race and stored within an individual, they
rendered it potentially accessible" (p. 2). This
had the effect ofplacing physiological
phenomena, such as instinct, habit and memory
on a continuum, as aspects ofone underlying
process. As a corollary, it served to link
physiology together with individual and social
psychology at a disciplinary level.
Otis claims that the theory oforganic
memory "pulled memory from the domain of
the metaphysical into the domain ofthe
physical with the intention ofmaking it
knowable" (p. 3). Here, her argument intersects
with Ian Hacking's (for whom Ribot also plays
an iconic role), that through the sciences of
memory at the end ofthe nineteenth century,
memory became the surrogate for the soul, and
rendered the spiritual domain knowable.
Otis argues that the organic memory theory
managed to become extremely popular, despite
the opposition offigures as diverse as August
Weismann, Henri Bergson, Aleksandr Luria,
Kurt Goldstein, Hermann Ebbinghaus, and
William James, through its metaphorical and
analogistic powers, which gave voice to
cultural concerns with race, nationalism and
identity, whilst cloaking them in a scientific
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